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Sackett v. EPA: Does It Signal the End of Coercive
CERCLA Enforcement?
A HYPOTHETICAL
Mr. Richards, the owner of a small auto-part manufacturing
company, purchases an old factory building in Michigan. He plans
to repurpose it, ideally without spending too much money.
Unbeknownst to Richards, the factory was previously owned by an
industrial chemical producer. After operating without incident for
five years, Richards begins to receive cease-and-desist notices from
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA alleges that
it has detected dangerous levels of chemicals in the soil under the
factory, and it believes that Richards’s company is to blame. The
EPA states that Richards may have violated the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), a federal statute regulating the cleanup and remediation
of toxic waste sites.1 Settlement talks between Richards and the
EPA break down when Richards denies that his company had
“anything whatsoever to do with the release of those chemicals.”
Using its “Enforcement First” policy,2 the EPA issues Richards a
Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) charging him with a
violation of CERCLA. Desperate, Richards makes a panicked call to
his lawyer, Norman Smith, and tries to find a way out. “Look,
Smith, can’t we just sue the EPA to get this order off our back?,”
Richards asks. “Nope. You’ve landed in a whole mess of trouble,”
Smith replies. “You have two choices—neither of them good. Either
you can foot the bill for the cleanup now and try to get
compensation later, or you can wait for the EPA to take us to court
with an enforcement action. Until then, we can’t fight this thing.”3
INTRODUCTION
The above hypothetical is based on a real case4 and illustrates
the profound difficulties faced by individuals and businesses issued
UAOs by the EPA under CERCLA. CERCLA explicitly denies any
Copyright 2014, by DAVID A. SAFRANEK.
1. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
2. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
“[Plaintiff] GE points to EPA’s ‘enforcement first’ policy, by which the agency
issues UAOs whenever settlement negotiations fail . . . .” Id.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006). The hypothetical is based in part on Solid
State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
4. See Solid State Circuits, 812 F.2d 383.
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access to pre-enforcement judicial review of these EPA
administrative orders, which have the force of law.5 Those who
violate the terms of a UAO can be hit with massive fines that could
reach $25,000 a day.6 Because fines are calculated from the day the
UAO is issued, parties who refuse to comply could face multimillion dollar contingent liabilities.7 Additionally, those who are
found to “willfully violate” a UAO “[w]ithout sufficient cause” are
subject to treble punitive damages.8
Not surprisingly, distressed regulated parties have repeatedly
challenged the constitutionality of both CERCLA and the EPA’s
practice of issuing UAOs while allowing the potential fines and
penalties to accumulate, alleging violations of their due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment.9 Thus far, these challenges have
not proven successful.10 Indeed, prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2012 decision in Sackett v. EPA, the judicial support for nonreviewable administrative orders, including CERCLA UAOs,
seemed well settled and consistent across the majority of federal
circuits.11 The use of such orders extends well beyond CERCLA and
5. By “force of law,” it is meant that a UAO alone is sufficient to create a
cause of action for the EPA to bring suit in federal district court. See In re Katania
Shipping Co., 8 E.A.D. 294 (EAB 1999).
6. See § 9606(b)(1).
7. Id.
8. See id.; id. § 9607(c)(3). Punitive damages are capped at three times the
total response cost. Id. For example, if the total response cost is $2 billion, punitive
damages up to $6 billion may be sought by the EPA in an enforcement action.
9. Parties have challenged all of the following: (1) the constitutionality of
treble punitive damages; (2) the constitutionality of non-reviewable UAOs; and (3)
the pattern and practice of resorting to UAOs for enforcement in almost every
instance. See infra Part I.E.
10. See infra Part I.E. The only successful constitutional challenge to
CERCLA UAOs to date occurred in Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., in which the
California District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the EPA’s
imposition of daily fines against an oil company. See Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599
F. Supp. 69, 74–75 (C.D. Cal. 1984). However, the Aminoil decision was
subsequently superseded by statute when Congress amended CERCLA to
expressly prohibit the type of constitutional challenge brought by the plaintiffs in
that case. Id. See also JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 SUPERFUND & BROWNFIELDS
CLEANUP § 7:5 (Sept. 2012 Update) (describing the effects of the 1986
amendments passed by Congress to expressly restrict pre-enforcement review of
CERCLA UAOs).
11. Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Lowell
Rothschild, Before and After Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
59-JUL FED. LAW. 46, 48 (2012) (“By 1995, the bar was so firmly in place that
the Tenth Circuit simply cited the opinions issued by the Seventh, Fourth, and
Sixth Circuit in its own three-page decision, stating that those cases were
indistinguishable and finding no reason to rule differently than those courts had.
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occurs in the context of other federal environmental statutes—
principally the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA).12
In Sackett, a unanimous Supreme Court signaled its profound
distaste for the EPA’s use of non-reviewable orders.13 Although
Sackett was decided in the context of the CWA, the ruling represents
a major shift from the traditional judicial support for non-reviewable
orders, which have been used by the EPA for decades to enforce the
CWA, in addition to CERCLA.14
This Comment argues that Sackett v. EPA discredits the
efficiency-based arguments used to justify non-reviewable UAOs,
thus rendering them unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. Further, this Comment suggests that the due
process deficiency of CERCLA UAOs can only be remedied by
providing greater access to pre-enforcement administrative hearings.
In Part I, this Comment first examines how Sackett v. EPA
represents a fundamental shift away from the previously widespread
judicial agreement in favor of barring pre-enforcement review of
compliance orders under the CWA. Part I continues by examining
the key cases that interpret the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause as applied to CERCLA and the primary arguments that have
been unsuccessfully used to challenge CERCLA UAOs in the past.
In Part II, this Comment challenges the efficiency-based arguments
that courts have used to justify the prohibition of all preenforcement judicial review of UAOs. Part II argues that the
absolute bar on review is unnecessary to preserve the utility of
UAOs and that meaningful alternatives to non-reviewable orders
already exist within the framework of CERCLA enforcement.
Finally, Part III of this Comment proposes that a pre-enforcement
evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge is the best
means available to both protect the due process rights of regulated
parties and minimize the EPA’s administrative costs. This solution
protects regulated parties by providing them with a meaningful
opportunity to present evidence and challenge the EPA’s claims

The Tenth Circuit noted that the plaintiff's ‘policy argument that it should not be
necessary to violate an EPA order and risk civil and criminal penalties to obtain
judicial review’ was ‘well taken, but did not offer them a better option.’” (quoting
Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 566 (1995))).
12. See Rothschild, supra note 11, at 48.
13. See Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1370 (2012).
14. Id.
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while providing a less expensive and time-consuming alternative to
judicial proceedings before an Article III court.
I. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NON-REVIEWABLE ORDERS
To best understand the history of non-reviewable administrative
orders such as CERCLA UAOs, it is most helpful to start with the
broadest and arguably most important limitation on the power of
government agencies: the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.15
The right to due process of law prior to a deprivation of property by
the government is a fundamental principle that underlies many
crucial legal challenges that have been launched against the EPA’s
use of UAOs to enforce the terms of CERCLA.16 Thus, this
Comment first outlines the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
including the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence applying due
process rights to the area of administrative law.17 After addressing
the Fifth Amendment’s role in limiting property deprivations by
government agencies, this Part examines the relevant sections and
legislative history of CERCLA18 and discusses several of the key
decisions that have shaped the interpretation of CERCLA’s bar on
pre-enforcement review.19 Finally, this Part presents and thoroughly
analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Sackett v. EPA.20
A. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states that “[n]o
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”21 In the area of CERCLA (and other federal
environmental statutes such as the CWA), the primary Fifth
Amendment concern is deprivation of property without due process
of law, which clearly includes fines, penalties, and contingent
liabilities.22

15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See infra Part I.D.
20. See infra Part I.E.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 30 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d,
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that contingent effects such as reduced
stock price and damaged brand value are protected property interests under the
Fifth Amendment). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C.
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B. Fifth Amendment Cases
1. Ex Parte Young
Ex Parte Young is the case most commonly cited to support the
argument that the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs violates the Fifth
Amendment due process rights of regulated parties.23 Ex Parte
Young is an important, early due process case involving railroad
rate-fixing statutes.24 The controversy arose out of a rate-fixing
statute passed by Minnesota in 1903 that fixed the maximum rate for
passenger tickets at two cents per mile and established a schedule of
other maximum rates for different types of cargo.25 Most
importantly, the statute carried severe monetary penalties for each
violation, with escalating fines for each subsequent penalty.26
The rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Young is
that a statutory scheme violates Fifth Amendment due process if
“the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and
imprisonment so severe as to intimidate [an affected party] from
resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation.”27 The
basic due process argument of Ex Parte Young, used against
CERCLA in later cases, is that statutory fines, when compounded
with punitive damages, are so enormous that they discourage
regulated parties from even attempting to challenge the EPA’s
administrative orders.28

Cir. 2010) (overruling this interpretation and denying that such contingent effects
are constitutionally cognizable property interests).
23. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 390–91 (8th Cir.
1987); Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 74–75 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Jackson,
595 F. Supp. 2d at 13. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), formed a core part of
the plaintiffs’ arguments in all of these cases.
24. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123.
25. Id. at 127.
26. Id. In pertinent part, the Minnesota statute at issue in Ex Parte Young
provided that a violator “shall be punished by a find [sic] of not less than $2,500,
nor more than $5,000 for the first offense, and not less than $5,000 nor more than
$10,000 for each subsequent offense.” Id. One prominent historical dollar
calculator provides an “economic power” value of $5,010,000 in 2012 dollars for
$10,000 in 1908. See MEASURING WORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/us
compare/relativevalue.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) [http://perma.cc/WPW3AP32] (archived June 2, 2014). Although a rough estimate, this figure provides
some sense of the magnitude of the fines at issue in Ex Parte Young. See id.
27. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 147.
28. See Solid State Circuits, Inc., 812 F.2d at 390–91; Aminoil, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. at 74–75; Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 13.
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2. Mathews v. Eldridge
Decided more than half a century after Ex Parte Young,
Mathews v. Eldridge29 is another important Supreme Court decision
that has been employed to both undermine and support the
constitutionality of CERCLA UAOs.30 Mathews, decided in 1965,
established the basic requirements of due process in the area of
administrative law.31 The case involved a dispute over Social
Security disability benefits.32 The Social Security Administration
made a final determination that Mr. Eldridge’s disability had come
to an end and denied his request to extend his eligibility.33 Mr.
Eldridge challenged the determination on the grounds that he had
not been afforded an evidentiary hearing to dispute the Agency’s
final decision and present evidence to support his claim.34
Reversing the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that Mr. Eldridge was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause before the termination of his disability benefits.35 According
to the Mathews Court, “The fundamental requirement of due process
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”36 However, the Court went on to discuss the
many differences, both in form and function, between the judicial
system and administrative agencies.37 Thus, the Court cautioned
against the “wholesale transplantation” of strict rules of evidence
and procedure that have evolved in Article III courts but may be
inappropriate for agencies in many circumstances.38 Looking at the
situation presented in Mathews, in which the Social Security
Administration had to efficiently process thousands of claims, the
Court concluded that “[t]he judicial model of an evidentiary hearing
is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of
29. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
30. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 21–38. In that case, the plaintiff–
corporation argued that Mathews mandated greater access to judicial review. Id. at
20. The D.C. District Court disagreed and ruled that, although Mathews provided
the controlling test, Mathews actually indicated that no pre-enforcement process
whatsoever was due to regulated parties issued a UAO under CERCLA. Id. at 38.
31. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325.
32. Id. at 323.
33. Id. at 323–24.
34. Id. at 323.
35. Id. at 320–21.
36. Id. at 333.
37. Id. at 348.
38. Id.
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decision-making in all circumstances.”39 Instead, the Court proposed
a four-factor test to determine whether access to an evidentiary
hearing must be provided:
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: [1] First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.40
The Court applied the first three factors to Mr. Eldridge’s claims
and found that, although Eldridge did have a significant interest in
the continuation of his Social Security benefits, the risk of error
imposed by making final determinations based only on a medical
officer’s report was low and the cost of adding additional
evidentiary hearings would be an excessive burden on the Agency.41
Finally, the Court reached the fourth factor—the public policy
balance: “In striking the appropriate due process balance the [fourth
and] final factor to be assessed is the public interest. This includes
the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be
associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an
evidentiary hearing . . . .”42 In the context of Social Security
benefits, the Court reasoned that it was more important to preserve
the resources of the public benefits program than to impose the costs
required to provide an evidentiary hearing every time benefits are
denied.43 While noting that financial cost alone was not a controlling
factor in its decision, the Court concluded that the overall burden
created by additional procedures was not in the public interest.44
C. CERCLA and Its Enforcement Mechanisms
Originally passed in 1980, CERCLA was designed to force
polluters to pay for the cleanup and remediation of environmental
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 334–35.
Id. at 340–47.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 348–49.
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damage caused by the release of toxic substances.45 Also commonly
known as the “Superfund” law, CERCLA was created in response to
public outrage at several nationally prominent ecological disasters in
the 1970s, particularly the infamous Love Canal disaster, which
occurred in Lewiston, New York, in 1978.46 As passed by Congress
in 1980, CERCLA was intended to create long-term liability for acts
of industrial pollution and to establish an industry-funded trust, or
“Superfund,” to pay for the cleanup of sites where the polluter was
no longer solvent or could not be found.47
Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA is given three potential
enforcement methods: (1) conduct the cleanup itself and bring suit
to recover the costs; (2) bring an enforcement action in federal
district court; or (3) issue a UAO to any potentially responsible party
(PRP).48 CERCLA section 106 also defines the procedures for
issuance of UAOs.49 Although CERCLA grants the President of the
United States the authority to issue UAOs to PRPs, presidents have
always delegated this authority to the EPA in its capacity as a
federal agency within the executive branch.50 Any person who
violates a section 106 UAO can be fined up to $25,000 for every day
of the violation.51 The EPA may seek punitive damages equal to
three times the total response cost from anyone who “willfully
violates” a UAO.52

45. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
46. Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses
Left?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 385, 387–88 (1988) (“In 1978, President Carter
declared a state of emergency at Love Canal, an upstate New York neighborhood
which had been developed above an abandoned hazardous waste site. The longburied chemicals on the site had contaminated the water supply in the area and
were seeping into the surface ground near the homes. Inhabitants in the area
reported a high incidence of health problems ranging from headaches to birth
defects. These health effects were traced to the presence of hazardous wastes on
the site.”).
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2006).
49. See id. § 9606(b)–(d).
50. See id. § 9606(a). See also Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139, 1141–42 (9th
Cir. 2010).
51. § 9606(b)(1).
52. Id. § 9607(c)(3). The standard of “willful violation” implies either
intentional or reckless disregard for an order issued under CERCLA. Id. When a
party is found guilty of willful violation, “[s]uch person may be liable to the
United States for punitive damages in an amount at least equal to, and not more
than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result of such
failure to take proper action.” Id.
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Section 113(h) creates a pre-enforcement bar to judicial review
of UAOs.53 This bar is “jurisdictional” in nature, purporting to
divest federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims
at all.54 It is important to note, however, that section 113(h) is a
product of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA), which amended CERCLA to include the explicit preenforcement review bar.55 Originally, CERCLA was designed in
much the same manner as the CWA and the CAA and did not
contain an express, statutory bar against pre-enforcement review but
only a judicially created bar.56
D. Fifth Amendment Due Process Challenges to CERCLA
1. Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. EPA
Decided by California’s Central District Court in 1984, Aminoil,
Inc. v. U.S. EPA was an important pre-SARA due process challenge
to the judicially created pre-enforcement review bar in CERCLA.57
In Aminoil, two oil companies, Aminoil, Inc. and McAuley Oil,
brought suit to enjoin the assessment of daily fines for
noncompliance with UAOs that the EPA had issued against them,
arguing that the EPA’s denial of a pre-enforcement hearing violated
their Fifth Amendment due process rights.58 Although the court
recognized the existence of a pre-enforcement bar to judicial review
of specific UAOs, it found that the plaintiffs’ claims presented a
constitutional challenge to CERCLA as a whole and concluded that
53. Id. § 9613(h).
54. See id. (stating in pertinent part that “[n]o Federal court shall have
jurisdiction under Federal law . . . to review any challenges to removal or remedial
action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any [unilateral
administrative] order issued under section 9606(a) of this title”).
55. O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:5. “In the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Congress enacted far reaching prohibitions on preenforcement review to ensure that the courts did not have a meaningful role in the
remedy selection and review process.” Id.
56. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1987);
Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 71 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Both Aminoil and
Solid State Circuits were decided before the passage of SARA. See Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1329 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
enactment of SARA in 1986 did not apply to actions filed before October 17,
1986, the date that SARA came into effect). Nevertheless, both courts noted that
judicial precedents, combined with evidence of congressional intent, created a preenforcement review bar, at least as to challenges against specific UAOs. See Solid
State Circuits, Inc., 812 F.2d at 388; Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 71.
57. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 69.
58. Id. at 71.
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it could properly exercise jurisdiction over the case.59 Granting a
preliminary injunction against the EPA’s assessment of fines or
punitive damages, the court used the Mathews test to find that the
lack of pre-enforcement review violated due process.60 Instead of
applying all four factors described by the Supreme Court, the
Aminoil court consolidated the test into three factors: (1) the private
interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation, and (3) the
government and public interest at stake.61
Looking to the first factor of Mathews—the private interest at
stake—the court stated that the private interest was the fundamental
right to be heard, rather than a mere financial interest in avoiding
payment of penalties.62 Further, the Aminoil court found that the
EPA’s use of UAOs fit within Ex Parte Young’s prohibition of
coercive statutory schemes that deter legal challenges through
massive fines and penalties: “[T]hat right [to judicial review] is
merely nominal and illusory if the party affected can appeal to the
courts only at the risk of having to pay penalties so great that it is
better to yield to orders of uncertain legality rather than to ask for
the protection of the law.”63 The court thus found a way to shoehorn
Ex Parte Young directly into the Mathews test, leading to a
fundamentally different conclusion than later cases challenging
CERCLA UAOs, such as GE IV.64
After finding that CERCLA UAOs, at least as used by the EPA,
fit within the prohibition of Ex Parte Young, the court proceeded to
analyze the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation.65
Avoiding a lengthy discussion of the relative risk of error, the
59. Id. at 72.
60. Id. at 74.
61. See id. (“In the case at bar, this Court must weigh: (1) plaintiffs’ interest
in seeking judicial review of the administrative order without the deterrent effect
of significant sanctions if they are ultimately unsuccessful, (2) the risk that
plaintiffs may be coerced into complying with the administrative order and be
precluded from asserting what may have been meritorious defenses, and (3) the
government’s and public’s interest in addressing emergency hazardous waste
situations promptly and effectively.”). Note that the court created this formula by
combining the third and fourth factors from Mathews, joining the governmental
and public interests into a single factor. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333–48 (1976).
62. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 74–75.
63. Id. at 75 (quoting Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 661
(1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2009)
(considering GE’s argument under Ex Parte Young as completely severable from
the Mathews analysis).
65. Aminoil, 599 F. Supp. at 75.
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Aminoil court simply stated that the plaintiffs faced a “substantial
risk” that they would be erroneously deprived of any funds used to
respond to the alleged CERCLA violations.66 The court concluded
that this financial cost was a sufficient property interest to trigger
Fifth Amendment due process protection.67
Turning to the third and final Mathews factor, the court admitted
that “[t]he government’s interest in the threat of significant sanctions
also deserves serious consideration.”68 The court concluded that the
government does have a legitimate interest in compelling quick
cleanup of industrial pollution and avoiding costly litigation.69
Despite these powerful governmental interests, the court ruled that
Aminoil was “likely to succeed” in its constitutional challenge to
CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar because, “[a]lthough the
government’s interest in handling emergency waste situations in an
efficacious manner is significant, this Court is not convinced that
this interest could not be addressed through a scheme that
nevertheless provides the most rudimentary elements necessary to
satisfy due process.”70 Although Aminoil left these “rudimentary
elements” undefined, in light of subsequent cases it appears that the
court was referring to administrative hearings before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), rather than full access to Article III
courts, which would be far more expensive.71
2. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A.
Decided by the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals three years
after Aminoil, Solid State Circuits v. E.P.A. was another high-profile
due process challenge to the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs.72 The
Solid State Circuits case grew out of a 1985 UAO issued jointly to
two Missouri corporations, Solid State Circuits, Inc. and Paradyne
Corp.73 In that UAO, the EPA alleged that chemicals used by the
two corporations for copper plating at their Republic, Missouri,

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 76.
71. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009)
(rejecting the feasibility of judicial review of UAOs but subsequently addressing
the possibility that adjudications before an ALJ or presiding officer could be used
instead).
72. Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1987).
73. Id. at 385–86.
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plant had leached into the surrounding soil and posed an imminent
threat to the town’s groundwater supply.74
The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a ruling that both the preenforcement review bar and the treble punitive damages portions of
CERCLA violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.75 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims
using the rule of Ex Parte Young and found that a judicial gloss on
CERCLA was necessary to save the punitive damages provision
from violating due process.76 The court recognized that a “good
faith defense” against the imposition of punitive damages must be
made available to regulated parties who have an “objectively
reasonable belief” that the UAO issued against them is legally
incorrect.77 Thus, while the court ultimately upheld CERCLA as
constitutional, it had to reach far beyond the plain language of the
statute to do so.78 Evidently, the Eighth Circuit viewed CERCLA as
teetering on the very edge of violating due process protections.79
3. The General Electric Co. v. Jackson Litigation
The General Electric Co. v. Jackson case was a post-SARA
constitutional challenge to the EPA’s use of CERCLA UAOs.80 The
challenge was brought by GE in response to some 68 UAOs issued
to GE by the EPA under CERCLA over a period of years.81 This
Comment focuses on the final two decisions in GE’s long-running
series of appeals. First, it examines the D.C. District Court’s

74. Id.
75. Id. at 385.
76. Id. at 391. The Eighth Circuit explained the requirements of Ex Parte
Young this way: “[T]o pass constitutional requirements, the standard must provide
parties served with EPA clean-up orders a real and meaningful opportunity to test
the validity of the order.” Id.
77. See id. at 392–93.
78. Id. at 392 (“[W]e hold that if neither CERCLA nor applicable EPA
regulations or policy statements provides the challenging party with meaningful
guidance as to the validity or applicability of the EPA order, Ex Parte Young and
its progeny require that the burden rest with the EPA to show that the challenging
party lacked an objectionably reasonable belief in the validity or applicability of a
clean-up order.”).
79. Id.
80. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
81. Id. at 12–13.
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decision (GE IV), followed by the final appeal to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals (GE V).82
i. General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE IV)
In GE IV, the District Court for the District of Columbia
considered both a facial constitutional challenge against CERCLA
and a claim that the EPA’s “pattern and practice” of issuing UAOs
violated GE’s due process rights.83 The first claim essentially
repeated the plaintiffs’ action in Solid State Circuits, and the
plaintiffs argued that the massive fines and punitive damages
provisions of CERCLA rendered the statute unconstitutional under
the rule of Ex Parte Young because they dissuaded GE from even
trying to challenge the validity of the EPA’s order.84 The court
dismissed this claim, ruling that judicial discretion over the
imposition of punitive damages formed a well-recognized exception
to Ex Parte Young and satisfied the requirements of due process.85
GE’s second claim alleged that the EPA’s “pattern and practice”
of resorting to UAOs in almost every instance to enforce CERCLA
also violated due process.86 GE’s argument in support of the pattern
and practice claim was based on the economics of publicly traded
companies.87 When reduced to its essence, GE’s argument asserted
that the mere issuance of a CERCLA UAO damages a public
company’s property, provoking sharp declines in stock price,
tarnishing the brand’s value in the minds of the public, and
ultimately reducing the company’s all-important ability to attract
future investment.88
The GE IV court analyzed GE’s pattern-and-practice claim
through the lens of the four-factor Mathews test.89 Applying the first
factor, the court expressed doubts about the $76.4 million loss that
the company claimed was a result of the UAO issued against it but
ultimately ruled that the reduction in stock price suffered by GE did
82. To maintain internal consistency, the GE decisions in this Comment
follow the numbering scheme recognized by the D.C. District Court, which
labeled the decision being appealed from the court below as “GE III.” See id. at
13.
83. Id.
84. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987);
Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13.
85. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 21–22.
88. Id.
89. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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qualify as a protected property interest: “The Court is persuaded that
noncomplying PRPs suffer a significant decrease in brand and
market value, albeit something less than $76.4 million. The Court
will proceed with the Mathews . . . assessment based on that
estimate of the private interest impacted by noncompliance.” 90
Looking to the private interest at stake, the court reasoned that,
although the potential financial loss resulting from a UAO is very
large, not all regulated parties will be affected to the same degree.91
As the court noted, some smaller companies cannot survive even
one UAO and will likely be put out of business, either due to the
cost of compliance or the penalties accruing from noncompliance.92
Overall, the court concluded that the high cost of complying with a
UAO ($4 million on average), 93 when combined with the range of
potential collateral losses (stock price reduction and brand value
damage), constituted a significant private interest.94
The court then examined the government’s interest in prompt
action and in avoiding additional pre-deprivation process.95
Highlighting evidence that the average response time to a CERCLA
waste site is eight years, the court found that the EPA lacked a
“special need for very prompt action.”96 Assessing the government’s
interest in avoiding additional pre-deprivation process, the court
found that the costs of providing access to Article III courts in every
case would be excessive given the high volume of UAOs issued by
the EPA.97
However, the court also identified a lower-cost alternative to
judicial review before an Article III court—an administrative
hearing before an ALJ or presiding officer.98 Because the attendant
90. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. (“UAOs could put some PRPs out of business. For other PRPs, UAOs
may affect operations, like whether to bid for new projects or to hire additional
employees.” (internal citations omitted)).
93. See id.
94. Id. (“[A] general conclusion is possible: although the private interests are
less constitutionally significant because they are primarily financial, they are
sufficiently large and have enough potential collateral effects to constitute weighty
private interests.”).
95. Id. at 32.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 33 (“The cost of the additional process also depends on how often
the government must provide it. Between August 16, 1982 and May 25, 2006—a
period of 285 months—EPA issued 1,705 UAOs to more than 5,400 PRPs. On
average, then, EPA has issued approximately six UAOs to nineteen PRPs every
month.” (internal citations omitted)).
98. See, e.g., id. at 38.
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costs are less, the court reasoned that the EPA has a lower interest in
avoiding administrative hearings.99 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the overall cost of allowing access to any evidentiary
hearing in the CERCLA UAO context would add large
administrative costs, projecting that many regulated parties would
choose to challenge UAOs if offered any opportunity to do so.100
Turning to the fourth and final Mathews factor, the district court
assessed the risk of erroneous deprivation of property resulting from
the EPA’s use of UAOs.101 The court found that of 68 UAOs issued
to GE by the EPA, only 5 contained evidence indicating that they
were issued in error.102 Pointing to precedents from the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, the court called this 4.4% rate of error
“acceptable.”103 Focusing on what it perceived as a low rate of
erroneous deprivation, the court concluded that even administrative
hearings before a presiding officer or ALJ are too burdensome and
costly to impose on the EPA when it issues a UAO under
CERCLA.104
ii. General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE V)
Decided in 2010, General Electric Co. v. Jackson (GE V)105 was
the appeal of the district court’s decision in GE IV to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals and marked the culmination of this long
line of constitutional challenges to CERCLA.106 Once again, the
legal precedent used to support the argument that UAOs violated
due process was Ex Parte Young.107 The D.C. Circuit resolved GE’s
facial challenge somewhat differently than the Eighth Circuit did in
Solid State Circuits.108 In GE V, the court found that CERCLA
section 106 (governing UAOs) fit within not just one but two well99. Id. (“At first glance, the burden on the government interest appears
minimal. For any given UAO, a hearing before a presiding officer would add only
weeks or a few months to an issuance process that usually takes years. Moreover,
the costs of a single hearing before a presiding officer are minimal, especially
considering the size of the private interests at stake.” (internal citations omitted)).
100. See id. at 39.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Id. at 37.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 36–38.
105. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011).
106. See id. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, GE’s long series of
appeals was brought to a close.
107. Id. at 119.
108. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987).
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recognized exceptions to the rule of Ex Parte Young.109 The court
concluded that where the fines and punitive damages are imposed at
the discretion of an Article III judge, Fifth Amendment due process
is satisfied.110 Additionally, the court noted that Solid State Circuits
ruled that plaintiffs benefit from a good faith defense to the
imposition of punitive damages.111
Although GE argued that the D.C. Circuit should follow the
district court below and apply the Mathews test to resolve its pattern
and practice claim, the D.C. Circuit rejected this approach, holding
that GE had not demonstrated a sufficient protected property interest
to support the claim.112 The court also rejected the findings of GE’s
study of CERCLA UAOs and dismissed the district court’s reliance
on that evidence.113 The GE V court thus dodged the question of
whether the Mathews test mandated greater access to evidentiary
hearings in the CERCLA context, providing no guidance as to
whether the Mathews analysis in GE IV was correct.114

109. See, e.g., Jackson, 610 F.3d at 117–19.
110. Id. at 118 (“Courts have also held that ‘there is no constitutional violation
if the imposition of penalties is subject to judicial discretion.’” (quoting Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986))).
111. Id. at 118–19 (“[C]ERCLA’s ‘sufficient cause’ defense is constitutionally
equivalent to a good faith defense and thus satisfies due process[.]” (quoting Solid
State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391–92 (8th Cir. 1987))).
112. Id. at 120–21. The court attacked GE’s reliance on “consequential
impacts” to establish its property interest: “GE’s case boils down to this: by
declaring that a PRP is responsible for cleaning up a hazardous waste site, a UAO
harms the PRPs reputation, and the market, in turn, devalues its stock, brand, and
credit rating. Viewed this way, GE’s argument is foreclosed by Paul v. Davis.” Id.
(citations omitted).
113. Id. at 128. The study surveyed all the reported UAOs issued by the EPA
under CERCLA over a period of several years. Id. Out of 1,638 parties issued
UAOs in the study period, only 75 or some 4.6% did not choose voluntary
compliance with their respective UAOs. Id. However, the court found that the low
rates of noncompliance could be easily explained: “[R]ecipients may be
complying in large numbers not because they feel coerced, but because they
believe that UAOs are generally accurate and would withstand judicial review.”
Id.
114. Id. (“Thus, because we have held that these consequential effects do not
qualify as constitutionally protected property interests . . . we need not—indeed,
we may not—apply Mathews v. Eldridge to determine what process is due. In
other words, even if GE is correct that EPA’s implementation of CERCLA results
in more frequent and less accurate UAOs, the company has failed to identify any
constitutionally protected property interest that could be adversely affected by
such errors.”).
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E. Sackett v. EPA
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari on GE V in 2011, it
appeared that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals would have the
final word on CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar.115 From then
on, it seemed, regulated parties would simply have to accept the idea
of non-reviewable UAOs and punishing fines for noncompliance.
Yet remarkably, only one year later the Supreme Court decided a
case that cast considerable doubt on the EPA’s reliance on nonreviewable orders as an enforcement mechanism. That case was
Sackett v. EPA,116 and although it was technically decided under the
aegis of the CWA, the reasoning used by the Court, and especially
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, casts grave doubts on the legal
underpinnings of GE V.117
1. Facts of the Case
The controversy in Sackett began when Michael and Chantell
Sackett started to excavate and fill part of their 0.63 acre home site
located near Priest Lake, Idaho.118 Unfortunately, the Sacketts’
home construction project ran into a seemingly insurmountable
obstacle—a letter from the EPA. On November 26, 2007, the EPA
issued a compliance order.119 That compliance order classified the
Sacketts’ home site on Priest Lake, Idaho, as a “wetland” under the
Clean Water Act (CWA) and mandated that they remove all the
gravel fill material and restore the land to its original condition,
putting the construction of their home on hold indefinitely.120 Even
worse for the Sacketts, the compliance order threatened massive
fines for any violation—up to $75,000 a day, every day.121

115. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011).
116. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012).
117. See infra Part I.E.4–5.
118. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. 1367.
119. Id.
120. See 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (granting EPA’s administrator jurisdiction over
“navigable waters of the United States”); see also Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370–71
(discussing the ambiguous reach of this nebulous term); Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715 (2006) (holding that even freshwater wetlands not adjacent to
navigable waters could be covered by the CWA).
121. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1375 (“If the owners do not do the EPA’s bidding,
they may be fined up to $75,000 per day ($37,500 for violating the Act and
another $37,500 for violating the compliance order).”).
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2. Legal Background
At first, the Sacketts requested an administrative hearing with
the EPA to review the compliance order, which was promptly
denied by the EPA.122 Next, the Sacketts filed suit in federal district
court in Idaho, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.123 The
district court granted the EPA’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, finding that judicial precedent clearly established
that Congress intended to prohibit pre-enforcement judicial review
of EPA compliance orders issued under the CWA.124
The Sacketts appealed the district court’s dismissal to the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Deciding the case de novo, the
Ninth Circuit closely reviewed both the legislative history of the
CWA125 and the decisions of other federal circuits on preenforcement review of CWA compliance orders.126 Ultimately, the
court concluded that “[i]n this assessment, we do not work from a
blank slate. Every circuit that has confronted this issue has held that
the CWA implicitly precludes judicial review of compliance orders
until the EPA brings an enforcement action in federal district
court.”127 Rejecting the Sacketts’ claim that the lack of an
administrative hearing violated their Fifth Amendment due process
rights, the court ruled that post hoc judicial discretion over the
imposition of penalties satisfied due process.128
122. See Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
123. Id. (“[The Sacketts] challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
(2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts’ procedural due process
rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an “any information available” standard that
is unconstitutionally vague.”).
124. See id. at 1141.
125. Id. at 1144 (“[W]e consider the legislative history of the CWA. The
enforcement provisions of the CWA were modeled on enforcement provisions in
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), and many courts have relied on similar provisions in
the CAA in concluding that the CWA precludes pre-enforcement judicial review
of compliance orders.”).
126. Id. at 1143 (“In this assessment, we do not work from a blank slate. Every
circuit that has confronted this issue has held that the CWA impliedly precludes
judicial review of compliance orders until the EPA brings an enforcement action
in federal district court.”).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1146 (“The amount of the penalty for noncompliance with a CWA
compliance order is to be determined by a court and is determined on the basis of
six factors: (1) the seriousness of the violation, (2) the economic benefit resulting
from the violation, (3) any history of CWA violations, (4) good-faith efforts to
comply, (5) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and (6) such other
matters as justice may require.”).
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3. Issues
When the case arrived before the Supreme Court, the issues
were narrowed by the Court’s grant of certiorari.129 In its grant, the
Court refined the controversy to two major questions: whether preenforcement review was allowed under the CWA and whether the
Sacketts’ inability to seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the
compliance order violated their procedural due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment.130
4. Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which held that there
was insufficient evidence of congressional intent in the CWA to
deny judicial review of EPA compliance orders and that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) creates a strong presumption
favoring judicial review where Congress has not spoken to the
issue.131 Scalia said that “finality” in the APA context essentially
depends on whether the Agency is willing to reconsider its
determinations.132 Here, the EPA denied the Sacketts an agency
hearing and was unwilling to reconsider, so the compliance order
was final and judicially reviewable.133 Scalia also disagreed with the
government’s claims that pre-enforcement review of the EPA’s
orders would harm enforcement of the CWA134 and greatly reduce
the Agency’s efficiency.135
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence sought to narrow the majority
opinion, establishing that the Court did not reach the issue of
whether the compliance order was correct, merely that the Sacketts
129. Sackett v. E.P.A., 131 S. Ct. 3092 (2011).
130. See id.
131. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
132. See id. at 1371–72. Scalia noted that the Agency had shut down the
formal negotiation process and solidified its position against the Sacketts: “The
mere possibility that an agency might reconsider in light of ‘informal discussion’
and invited contentions of inaccuracy does not suffice to make an otherwise final
agency action nonfinal.” Id. at 1372.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1374 (“Compliance orders will remain an effective means of
securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no
substantial basis to question their validity.”).
135. Id. (“The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the
principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think
that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of
regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’ without the opportunity for judicial
review . . . .”).
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could challenge the EPA’s determination that their home site
qualifies as a wetland under the CWA.136 Finally, Justice Alito
wrote an aggressive concurrence attacking the “unthinkable”
methodology of the EPA, and he strongly suggested that the core
issue in the case was the violation of the Sacketts’ due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment.137 Alito also chastised Congress for
failing to clarify the issue for many years.138
5. The Impact of Sackett on the Administrative Law Landscape
Before Sackett, there was broad agreement that the CWA (much
like the CAA) implicitly prohibited pre-enforcement judicial review
of compliance orders.139 While the majority opinion ultimately rests
on the lack of congressional intent to prohibit pre-enforcement
review in the CWA, the due process claim made by the Sacketts
clearly underlies the dismay expressed by the Court at the unfair
tactics used by the EPA to avoid judicial review and coerce
landowners into compliance.140 Alito’s concurrence serves to
elevate the due process issue to the forefront and condemns the
EPA’s methods in the strongest terms.141
II. CERCLA’S PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW BAR IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Part II of this Comment argues that Sackett v. EPA
fundamentally undercut the legal justifications that have been used
to sustain CERCLA’s pre-enforcement review bar. First, Sackett
renews the viability of arguments tracing their theoretical basis to Ex
Parte Young and the notion that parties should not have to face
devastating fines merely to challenge the validity of a UAO.142
Second, this Part contends that the application of Mathews to
CERCLA, as found in GE IV, is flawed and that a correct
136. Id. at 1367.
137. See id. at 1375. Alito argued that the CWA: (1) is of uncertain
jurisdictional reach; (2) imposes large penalties for noncompliance; and (3) greatly
restricts the opportunity for judicial review. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). Based on
these three features, he concluded that, “[i]n a nation that values due process, not
to mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” Id.
138. Id.
139. Sackett v. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Sackett,
132 S. Ct. 1367. See also Rothschild, supra note 11, at 48.
140. See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 137.
142. See infra Part II.A.
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interpretation of Mathews militates against the current use of
UAOs.143 Third, Part II argues that the logic of Sackett should apply
to CERCLA and mandates a change away from the EPA’s current
use of UAOs to address every possible CERCLA violation.144
A. Sackett v. EPA Gives New Strength to Due Process Arguments
Based on Ex Parte Young
If one word could be used to characterize the due process
arguments based on Ex Parte Young that were used by the plaintiffs
in Solid State Circuits145 and GE IV,146 that word would probably be
“stale.” Ex Parte Young was decided in a world that operated on
principles and assumptions fundamentally different from those of
the 21st century. Most importantly for the purposes of this
Comment, federal environmental regulations of the kind embodied
by CERCLA did not exist in 1908.147 Thus, although the principle
that no person should have to face a damning “Hobson’s Choice”
between facing massive fines or challenging a regulation that he or
she knows to be illegal remains good law, cases such as GE IV and
GE V show that courts no longer give as much weight to the due
process considerations of Ex Parte Young.148 The results in these
two cases are not surprising—on the one hand, the plaintiffs
presented a case dating to the early 1900s; on the other hand, the
EPA articulated policy objectives and administrative efficiency
arguments pertinent to the modern world.149 It was therefore
perfectly reasonable to find that the rule of Ex Parte Young, at least

143. See infra Part II.B.
144. See infra Part II.C.
145. See Solid State Circuits, Inc. v. E.P.A., 812 F.2d 383, 391 (8th Cir. 1987).
146. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 118–19 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
147. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History
of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 131 (2002) (“The
relative lack of federal financing for local pollution control efforts in the 1960s
reflected the low priority that federal officials placed on environmental concerns.
In prior decades, it could be argued that Congress’ failure to appropriate money
represented the traditional view that federal government should focus federal
resources on truly national concerns, leaving state and local governments to fund
state and local projects, including river cleanup.”).
148. See infra Part II.E.
149. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d,
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Jackson, 610 F.3d at 118 (“We therefore join three
of our sister circuits that have rejected similar Ex Parte Young challenges to
CERCLA’s UAO regime.”).
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as it was presented in the GE cases, must bow before the demands of
CERCLA.150
Moreover, the original rule of Ex Parte Young has been
progressively weakened by numerous exceptions over nearly a
century of judicial interpretation.151 The most devastating of these
exceptions from the viewpoint of the CERCLA-regulated party is
surely the one recognized by the D.C. Circuit in GE V.152 In that
case, the court found that judicial discretion over the imposition of
fines and punitive damages completely satisfied Fifth Amendment
due process concerns, regardless of the potential size or punitive
nature of those damages.153 Simply put, this exception is so large
that it “swallows the rule” of Ex Parte Young. In the context of
environmental statutes such as CERCLA or the CWA, fines and
penalties will never be enforced without some degree of judicial
discretion.154 Of additional concern is the low rate at which judicial
discretion enters into the equation at all, given the highly coercive
nature of the EPA’s use of UAOs.155 The harsh reality is that most
regulated parties will simply buckle to the EPA’s demands, fearing
the outcome of a long-postponed enforcement action that could
multiply fines and penalties into the multimillion dollar range.156
This same problem—allowing fines to pile up while the private
party must patiently wait for judicial review—was at the heart of the
Supreme Court’s concern with the EPA’s conduct in Sackett v.
EPA.157 In that case, the Sacketts had absolutely no power to initiate
150. See Jackson, 610 F.3d at 118.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 118 (“Courts have also held that ‘there is no constitutional violation
if the imposition of penalties is subject to judicial discretion.’” (quoting Wagner
Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir.1986))).
153. Id. at 128.
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (providing for civil actions under
CERCLA); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) (providing for civil actions under the CWA).
Both statutes provide judicial discretion over the imposition and amount of
statutory fines and penalties but give complete control over the timing of review to
the EPA. See also Sackett v. E.P.A, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012) (noting the lack
of control regulated parties have over judicial review).
155. See Jackson, 610 F.3d at 128 (noting the tiny 4.6% rate of noncompliance
in more than 1,638 CERCLA-regulated parties studied). Over the total lifespan of
CERCLA (1982–2006), the percentage of noncompliance was an even smaller
3.5%. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 19 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
156. O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:6.
157. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372 (“In Clean Water Act enforcement cases,
judicial review ordinarily comes by way of a civil action brought by the EPA
under 33 U.S.C. § 1319. But the Sacketts cannot initiate that process, and each day
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the judicial review process; instead, the couple was only entitled to
“wait and see” if the EPA would ever file an enforcement action,
and all the while, penalties of $75,000 per day loomed over their
heads.158 The hope that at some point within the next five years, a
judge would consider whether those penalties were proper must
have been small comfort to the Sacketts.159 Although the court in
GE IV found “no hard evidence” that the EPA routinely waits the
maximum five years before filing an enforcement action, the mere
prospect that the EPA could wait that long creates devastating
uncertainty.160 The essential fact remains that the Sacketts, much
like CERCLA-regulated parties, had no control whatsoever over
when, or even if, judicial review of their cases would occur.161 It is
this second factor, the lack of control and excessive uncertainty of
judicial review, that strengthens the Fifth Amendment argument
based on Ex Parte Young. Sackett v. EPA thus makes it clear that
massive fines are not the only problem with “non-reviewable”
administrative orders, whether they occur under the CWA or
CERCLA.
B. Properly Applied, the Mathews Test Mandates Additional Access
to Evidentiary Hearings Under CERCLA
Despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit refused to apply the
Mathews test in GE V,162 there is broad agreement that Mathews
determines whether Fifth Amendment due process requires that an
evidentiary hearing be provided by an administrative agency prior to

they wait for the agency to drop the hammer, they accrue, by the Government’s
telling, an additional $75,000 in potential liability.”).
158. Id.
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2006) (establishing a five-year statute of
limitations for all actions by the federal government seeking monetary damages);
see also Friends of the Earth v. Facet Enters., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532. (W.D.N.Y.
1984) (ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to CWA enforcement actions for civil
penalties). Assuming that the EPA waited the maximum period to file suit against
the Sacketts, a staggering maximum potential penalty of $136,875,000 would have
resulted ($75,000 multiplied by 1,825 days). See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370
(establishing a maximum penalty of $75,000 per day).
160. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 24. But see O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:6.
(arguing that PRPs are coerced by the specter of long delays before any
enforcement action is brought, together with the resulting daily penalties).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006); Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at
1372.
162. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011).
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a deprivation of property.163 Therefore, the true inquiry is whether
Mathews would require such a hearing in the context of CERCLA
UAOs. The paradigm case applying Mathews to CERCLA UAOs
after the 1986 SARA amendments is GE IV.164 However, the D.C.
District Court made significant mistakes when it applied the fourfactor Mathews test.165
1. GE IV Assigns Too Much Weight to the Risk of Erroneous
Deprivation
The primary error of GE IV was its application of the third factor
of the Mathews test regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation.
After deciding that “abstract concepts” of whether the UAO process
is likely to be error prone are inconclusive,166 the court relied almost
entirely on the evidence produced by GE in discovery.167 Based on
this data, the court concluded that the rate of error in UAOs issued
under CERCLA in the study period was less than or equal to 4.4%, a
rate that it deemed acceptable.168 The court assumed that where the
risk of error is small, the risk of harm is equivalently small; but in
the CERCLA context, this approach creates inequitable results.169
As the GE IV court admitted, “CERCLA-regulated party” is a term
with a very broad reach, covering some individuals as well as many
businesses of every size and description.170 Although some of these
regulated parties, such as the General Electric Co. in GE IV, clearly
have the financial strength to survive the financial and reputational
damage inflicted by an erroneous UAO, many do not.171 As the
court noted, even one UAO is sufficient to bankrupt many smaller

163. See, e.g., id. The court would have applied Mathews but for its ruling that
GE had no constitutionally protected property interest under the Fifth Amendment.
Id. See also Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 20–22; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F.
Supp. 69, 74 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
164. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 20–38.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 33–35 (“Therefore, although several aspects of the pre-UAO
issuance process suggest, in the abstract, a high risk of error, others suggest neither
a high nor a low risk of error, and still others suggest a low risk of error.”).
167. See id. at 35–37.
168. Id. at 37.
169. Id. at 30 (“UAOs could put some PRPs out of business. For other PRPs,
UAOs may affect operations, like whether to bid for new projects or to hire
additional employees.” (internal citations omitted)).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., id.
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businesses, even if the expected response costs fall short of GE’s
claimed figure of $4 million.172
Another problem with the GE IV court’s approach to erroneous
deprivation is the weight given to the statistical data produced by
GE.173 In effect, the court allowed the risk of erroneous deprivation
to control the result in GE IV and used a specific subset of the data
provided by GE to establish the risk of error in CERCLA UAOs.174
Instead of basing its conclusion on such a narrow set of data, which
pertained only to GE, the GE IV court should have considered the
broader effects of the UAO enforcement scheme on all regulated
parties.175 As the Supreme Court noted in Mathews, “[b]are statistics
rarely provide a satisfactory measure of the fairness of a decisionmaking process.”176 Such statistics are an even less reliable test of
due process fairness when they only pertain to a particular party in a
particular case.177
The net effect of the district court’s ruling in GE IV is to allow
data produced by GE to determine the due process rights of all other
CERCLA-regulated parties, regardless of their size, situation, or
relative means. Big, multinational companies like GE are thus
lumped together with much smaller businesses, leading to punishing
results for those relatively tiny companies. Because of the postSARA ban on constitutional challenges against individual UAOs,178
only broad facial challenges against the UAO enforcement scheme
172. Id. at 38 (“If the PRP complies, then the average costs of compliance are
$4 million and the deprivation lasts for an average of three years.”).
173. See id. at 35–37.
174. Id. at 37 (“In sum, when all four categories of evidence proffered by GE
are carefully scrutinized, GE has pointed to just five instances of error—four
examples from specific sites described in GE’s declarations and one example of a
complying PRP successfully obtaining reimbursement from the government.”).
175. See id. at 28–30. Of the evidence provided by GE, the most important
measure is surely the paltry 4.6% of regulated parties who actually chose not to
comply with a UAO during the study period. See also O’REILLY, supra note 10, §
7:6 (“Because the risks, in terms of increased costs or penalties, are often too great
for PRPs to refuse to settle with the Agency in the hope of later challenging EPA’s
remedy, PRPs frequently agree to perform EPA-selected work even when they
have strong arguments that the Agency’s remedy is inappropriate.”).
176. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976).
177. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2006) (creating the current pre-enforcement
review bar); O’REILLY, supra note 10, § 7:5 (“[Section] 113(h) bars judicial
review of an EPA removal or remedial action until the Agency has taken some
enforcement action . . . .”); see also Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 72
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that judicial review of facial constitutional challenges to
CERCLA was not precluded).
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in general will ever be possible.179 Further, since only the largest
regulated parties can afford to mount lengthy constitutional
challenges to CERCLA, the interests of smaller entities will not be
adequately represented.180 Therefore, as long as these broad
challenges are based on data collected by individual plaintiffs, as in
the GE cases, the results will be skewed and detrimentally affect
many smaller regulated parties who cannot bear the cost of such
litigation.181
2. Sackett v. EPA Supports Aminoil’s Conclusion That the
Public Interest Weighs Against the Pre-Enforcement Review Bar
Although the GE IV opinion does contain a detailed segment
dedicated to balancing the other three factors with one another,182 it
ultimately neglects to properly consider the “public interest” factor
listed by the Supreme Court in Mathews.183 For a proper analysis of
the public interest at stake in CERCLA, it is necessary to look
instead to Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. EPA in which the court did attempt
to define and weigh the public interest factor.184 In Aminoil, the
court did not discount the “significant” interest of the public and
government in prompt handling of toxic waste disasters but ruled
that some “rudimentary” due process protections could be provided
to regulated parties without greatly compromising CERCLA’s
goals.185
As noted by the D.C. District Court in GE IV, there are other,
more “rudimentary” options for ensuring due process, besides full
trials before an Article III court.186 Such options include
administrative hearings, whether before an ALJ or a presiding
179. See Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 2d at 72 (holding that judicial review of
facial constitutional challenges to CERCLA was not precluded); see also Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2959 (2011) (noting that even after SARA and the addition of CERCLA section
113(h), a facial constitutional challenge against CERCLA is not prohibited, so
long as it “does not challenge any particular action or order by EPA”).
180. See, e.g., Jackson, 610 F.3d 110. By the time GE’s petition for certiorari
was denied by the Supreme Court in 2011, GE’s constitutional challenge had been
in near constant litigation for more than ten years.
181. See supra note 169, 175.
182. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 37–39.
183. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 347 (1976) (“In striking the
appropriate due process balance the final factor to be assessed is the public
interest.”).
184. Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 75–76 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
185. Id. at 76.
186. See, e.g., Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
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officer.187 Unlike Aminoil, however, the GE IV court ultimately
concluded that the additional costs imposed by even administrative
hearings could not be justified.188 Wholly accepting the EPA’s
efficiency-based arguments, the D.C. District Court found that
forcing the Agency to provide any kind of evidentiary hearing
would impermissibly frustrate the goals of CERCLA enforcement as
contemplated by Congress.189 GE IV thus stands for the principle
that the pre-enforcement review bar in CERCLA must be upheld
against due process challenges to protect the EPA’s administrative
efficiency.190
Despite the court’s decision in GE IV, the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Sackett v. EPA provides strong evidence that Aminoil was
fundamentally correct, at least in terms of the Mathews public policy
balance.191 Like Aminoil,192 the majority opinion in Sackett
expressed grave concern with the coercive effects of non-reviewable
administrative orders.193 However, Sackett went even further than
Aminoil and rejected the substance of the EPA’s efficiency-based
arguments for the maintenance of a pre-enforcement review bar.194
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected the notion that
non-reviewable orders are essential to the EPA’s enforcement
efforts.195 Instead, he argued that administrative orders will continue
to be an effective mechanism for enforcement, wherever they are
essentially correct and supported by the weight of evidence.196

187. Id.
188. Id. at 38–39.
189. Id. at 36–38.
190. Id.
191. See supra Part I.E; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 76 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
192. Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 76.
193. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373–74 (2012).
194. Id. at 1374 (“Finally, the Government notes that Congress passed the
Clean Water Act in large part to respond to the inefficiency of then-existing
remedies for water pollution. Compliance orders, as noted above, can obtain quick
remediation through voluntary compliance. The Government warns that the EPA
is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial review. That may be
true—but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review.”).
195. See, e.g., id.
196. Id. (“Compliance orders will remain an effective means of securing
prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial
basis to question their validity.”).
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C. UAOs Must Not Be the EPA’s Default Method of CERCLA
Enforcement
Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA has three different
options for enforcement: (1) conduct the cleanup itself and sue for
compensation; (2) bring an enforcement action in district court; or
(3) issue a UAO against a potentially responsible party (PRP)
charging a violation of CERCLA.197 When it passed CERCLA,
Congress created a range of enforcement choices to suit different
kinds of pollution emergencies.198 For example, option one, in
which the EPA conducts the cleanup itself, is ideally suited for
environmental catastrophes that pose such an imminent threat that
the government simply cannot wait for a PRP to conduct its own
cleanup.199 While this still does occasionally occur, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, issuance of a UAO is the only
response chosen by the EPA to enforce CERCLA.200
In effect, UAOs have become a kind of “super order” that
renders every other alternative enforcement mechanism largely
irrelevant.201 The reasons for this development are not difficult to
grasp—the EPA enjoys complete insulation from judicial review for
up to five years when using UAOs.202 Further, the practice of
allowing fees to accrue pending some hypothetical enforcement
action in the future creates a level of coercion that cannot be
matched by the other two alternatives under CERCLA section
106.203
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b) (2006).
198. See id. § 9606(a); Aminoil, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 71 (“Congress plainly
gave the President authority to address situations endangering ‘public health and
welfare and the environment,’ and such authority necessitates broad flexibility in
promptly and effectively responding to the emergency.” (citations omitted)).
199. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 32 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 610
F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“In true emergency situations, EPA cleans up a site
itself and later files a cost recovery action.”).
200. See id. at 33 (noting the vast number of UAOs issued over the existence
of CERCLA). “Between August 16, 1982 and May 25, 2006—a period of 285
months—EPA issued 1,705 UAOs to more than 5,400 PRPs. On average, then,
EPA has issued approximately six UAOs to nineteen PRPs every month.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). The court also notes that, over the same period, only
3.5% of PRPs chose noncompliance, meaning that the EPA only had to file some
189 enforcement actions under CERCLA section 106. See id. at 28.
201. See, e.g., id.
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (establishing a five-year statute of limitations for all
actions by the federal government seeking monetary damages); see also Friends of
the Earth v. Facet Enterprises, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.Y.1984) (ruling that
28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to CWA enforcement actions for civil penalties).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b); Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
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The Court in Sackett v. EPA ruled against an identical
enforcement structure under the CWA, arguing that administrative
orders (such as UAOs) are still useful to the EPA, even if they are
subject to judicial review.204 The reasoning used by Justice Scalia to
support this conclusion, namely that the great majority of orders will
not be challenged because they are factually correct, is actually
supported by the evidence analyzed by the GE IV court.205 There is
no reason to believe that the EPA’s methods of investigation and
enforcement differ greatly between the CWA and CERCLA.206
Thus, there is simply no reason why the Court’s conclusion in
Sackett v. EPA should not also apply to CERCLA. Therefore, even
if UAOs are made subject to judicial review, it is likely that the EPA
will still be able to obtain quick compliance in a majority of
cases.207
III. THE ALJ SOLUTION
In Sackett, the Court proposed one potential solution to the
problem of non-reviewable compliance orders—allowing preenforcement judicial review.208 However, there is another
possibility—a solution founded upon the very structure of
administrative law. This Comment argues that the best available
means of satisfying the requirements of Fifth Amendment due
process is the use of adjudications or hearings presided over by
ALJs.209 Agency hearings are typically much more informal and
204. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1374 (2012).
205. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011). The evidence collected by GE in GE V showed
that only around 4.6% of parties issued a UAO by the EPA in the study period did
not comply with that order. Id. As the GE V court noted, there is a strong
possibility that the low level of noncompliance observed was due in large part to
most of the UAOs being correct. Id.
206. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372–73. CWA compliance orders are
functionally the same as CERCLA UAOs. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (2006),
with 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006). They are used for the same purpose—to obtain
compliance from regulated parties. Id. In both cases, fines for noncompliance are
calculated from the date the orders are issued. Id. Until recently, both were also
immune from pre-enforcement judicial review. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1372–73.
207. See Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (finding that the average time for
cleanup of a CERCLA waste site is eight years). Although the court did not
provide a separate average for those parties who choose noncompliance, it is
logical to assume that the average time to clean up sites owned by noncomplying
PRPs is substantially longer, on account of lengthy legal challenges. Id.
208. See Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1374.
209. See infra Part III.A–B.
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thus much less costly than Article III trials.210 Like Article III
judges, ALJs are neutral decision-makers.211 However, unlike
federal judges, ALJs possess specialized training in their respective
fields, allowing them to accurately assess the validity of the complex
scientific evidence that is crucial to CERCLA cases. Additionally,
hearings can be completed in a relatively short amount of time,
especially when compared to Article III trials.212 In adjudications,
both parties have the chance to present their evidence and make
arguments before a neutral decision-maker who is not controlled by
the administrative agency.213
Allowing a PRP to contest a UAO at an early date would
alleviate many of the devastating financial consequences identified
by the D.C. District Court in GE IV.214 The increased certainty
provided by a swift and fair ALJ adjudication should reduce
damaging fluctuations in stock price and serve to reassure a PRP’s
creditors and investors.215 Finally, the use of an ALJ would satisfy
Fifth Amendment due process requirements under Mathews v.
Eldridge because it would provide a meaningful opportunity for
PRPs to confront the evidence against them and present any
available defenses to CERCLA liability.216
A. Proposed Procedure for CERCLA Administrative Hearings
To complete the proposed ALJ solution to due process
deficiencies in CERCLA UAOs, this Comment proposes both
procedures and effective remedies to facilitate administrative
hearings. For ALJ adjudication to form an effective alternative to
Article III courts, ALJs must have broad powers to resolve disputes
over all parts of the UAO regime, including whether issuance was
proper, the appropriate scope of the UAO, and what cleanup
210. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69,
76 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
211. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 32–33 (“[C]ourts have held that an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and a detached “presiding officer” within an
agency, are both adequate neutral decision-makers.” (internal citations omitted)).
212. Id. at 38. Another option discussed by the GE IV court is a hearing before
a presiding officer, a neutral Agency employee with decision-making power. See
id. at 32–33.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 36–38.
215. E.g., id. Although GE IV resolved the balance of interests in favor of
preserving the pre-enforcement bar, the court acknowledged that PRPs would
greatly benefit from early review of some type. Id.
216. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
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activities should be required. Fully addressing these issues demands
a multi-stage procedural approach to each challenged UAO.
First, the ALJ must examine all the relevant evidence provided
by the EPA in support of the UAO, together with any evidence
submitted by the regulated party.217 Because CERCLA imposes
strict liability, most defenses would likely revolve around whether
the toxic substance allegedly released falls under CERCLA or
whether contamination was caused by an act of God or other
unforeseeable cause, such as sabotage by a third party.218 At this
stage, the ALJ would employ his or her vast experience, drawn from
deciding countless similar disputes, to quickly sort through the
scientific evidence and determine whether the UAO was properly
issued and whether the alleged violation falls within the scope of
CERCLA.219 This faster speed of resolution would greatly reduce
the time for large, daily fines to run against the PRP and would
make contesting the UAO an economically viable solution.220
If the ALJ is satisfied that the evidence supports the issuance of
the UAO, then the ALJ could proceed to the next stage—
determining the proper scope of that UAO. In most cases, this
second step should be quite brief. If the EPA has provided the
appropriate scientific justification for issuance of the UAO, the
Agency should be afforded some level of deference on its
determination of scope. Because the ALJ has no first-hand
experience of the pollution problem, the ALJ must give deference to
the testimony and reports of EPA investigators. However, such
217. Although this process may seem unfairly weighted in favor of the
Agency, the requirement that all evidence be presented is in fact the best guarantee
of fairness. Through this process, the EPA would be forced to substantiate all
charges at an early stage and would be dissuaded from issuing a UAO prematurely
on scant evidence. Note that currently, all CERCLA requires for the issuance of a
UAO is the administrator’s “belief” that a violation has occurred, on the basis of
“any information available.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2006). The effect of this
change, if effectively implemented, would be to force the administrator to consider
whether the information presented to him is reliable enough to survive review by
an ALJ. Id.
218. See Glass, supra note 46, at 395.
219. The depth of experience developed by ALJs hearing CERCLA UAO
challenges is a primary difference between ALJs and Article III judges and is
essential to the efficient resolution of such claims. See, e.g., Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Com’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991) (noting
the depth of expertise administrative agencies develop in interpreting and applying
their own regulations).
220. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 38 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d,
610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (establishing an average deprivation of $4 million
for three years to PRPs under the current CERCLA enforcement regime for a
single UAO).
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deference should not be absolute. Where regulated parties can
substantially rebut the EPA’s contentions through competent
evidence of their own, the ALJ should be cognizant of the
possibility that the scope of the UAO may need to be reduced.221
The last stage of an ALJ’s examination of a UAO should be the
degree and kind of cleanup required. Much like the second step, this
third phase should receive considerable deference in the great
majority of cases. Only where the record reveals a significant
disparity between the risks posed by contamination and the extent of
the proposed cleanup should the ALJ consider altering the terms of
the UAO.
B. Proposed Administrative Remedies for ALJ Review of UAOs
This Comment proposes that an effective regime of ALJ
adjudications must have meaningful remedies at its disposal to solve
the current due process deficiencies in CERCLA’s UAO
enforcement scheme. Essentially, ALJs should have access to three
basic remedies when confronting a challenged UAO: (1) accept and
endorse the order as it stands, (2) reject it for insufficient evidence,
or (3) modify its terms. These three options will be addressed in
turn.
The first option, to accept and endorse the UAO as issued,
should be the result whenever the EPA can produce sufficient
scientific evidence to support the UAO. There is little reason to
believe that endorsement would not be the “default option” for most
cases that come before an ALJ. Because the efficiency and cost
savings of the ALJ system depend, at least in part, on greatly relaxed
rules of procedure, a formal standard of proof for the EPA cannot
and should not be imposed on ALJ adjudications. Nevertheless, this
Comment proposes that the ALJ should examine scientific evidence
and hear testimony from both sides whenever it is available and that
the ALJ should adjudicate the case using something approaching a
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof generally applied
to civil actions.222 Thus, whenever the EPA’s evidence presents a
221. As a hypothetical example, assume the EPA produces investigative
reports alleging toxic contamination of three of the PRP’s industrial facilities.
However, the PRP commissions a thorough, independent scientific evaluation that
reveals only two of the properties are contaminated by measureable amounts of
toxin. In this scenario, the ALJ should properly limit the scope of the UAO to the
two contaminated properties.
222. It must be emphasized that ALJs cannot and should not be constrained to
a single approach. Other standards of proof may well be appropriate in individual
cases. This flexibility forms a large part of the ALJ system’s appeal.
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more plausible version of events, the UAO should stand as issued.
Through this process, a record would undoubtedly be produced―a
record that would greatly assist the EPA in forcing settlement of the
many clear-cut cases identified by the court in GE IV.223 This benefit
to the EPA must not be minimized; by producing a clear record of
all the available evidence at an early stage, the clarity of the facts
would force many (if not the majority of) cases into settlement,
avoiding costly litigation.
The second option for an ALJ examining a UAO must be
rejection for insufficient evidence. The possibility that a UAO could
be rejected, no matter how unlikely, gives real teeth to the role of the
ALJ adjudication as a means of protecting regulated parties’ due
process rights.224 Clearly, some impetus is also needed to encourage
the EPA to be careful about when and how it issues UAOs.
Rejection would provide this impetus and serve as a warning that
UAOs based on merely speculative evidence will not be tolerated.
Of course, such power should be used sparingly.
The third and final remedy available to an ALJ should be
modification of the challenged UAO. As a remedy, modification is
necessitated by the reality that either the scope or proposed cleanup
responsibilities contained in a challenged UAO may be incorrect.
For these cases, efficiency dictates an intermediate remedy, which is
neither approval nor complete rejection of the UAO. In such cases,
the ALJ could effectively resolve the dispute and protect the
interests of both the EPA and the regulated party by modifying the
terms of the UAO.225
Overall, the efficiency of the ALJ solution to the due process
deficiencies of CERCLA UAOs depends greatly on the availability
of effective remedies. Without such powers, any adjudication would
be a fruitless exercise and no help to those adversely affected by an
improper UAO. Moreover, through careful use of the remedies
proposed by this Comment, an ALJ can actually aid the EPA by
producing a complete factual record at an early stage of the dispute.
When this record reflects that the EPA has correctly issued a UAO,
223. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2959 (2011) (noting the strong likelihood that the
overwhelming rate of compliance with UAOs indicates that most of them are
fundamentally correct).
224. See supra note 217.
225. Modification would most likely be in favor of the regulated party, but it
need not always be so. Where the facts reveal that the challenged UAO is in fact
too narrow, the ALJ should retain the power to expand its terms or geographic
reach. In this way, ALJ adjudications can actually assist the EPA in the efficient
administration of CERCLA.
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the ALJ adjudication would serve to compel swift settlement and
reduce the need for costly litigation.
CONCLUSION
After Sackett v. EPA, courts should find that CERCLA’s nonreviewable UAOs violate the Fifth Amendment due process rights
of regulated parties. Striking down the prohibition on preenforcement review of UAOs will not destroy either CERCLA or
the EPA. Instead, with a well-established and efficient ALJ process
in place, regulated parties would be able to effectively assert their
rights in the face of contested UAOs and quickly obtain guidance
from a qualified, neutral decision-maker. The speedy resolution of
claims by ALJs would undoubtedly reduce litigation expenses for all
parties. Ultimately, the size of CERCLA fines and even their
necessity as a means of coercing compliance should diminish. As
the court stated in Mathews, “[t]he essence of due process is the
requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given)
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”226
Through the proposed administrative hearings, regulated parties in
jeopardy of devastating CERCLA fines would finally gain an
opportunity to contest the EPA’s charges against them.
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